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Using a simple but general formalization, we state the conditions under which one
might expect a negative or positive relationship between preexisting trust and gov-
ernance complexity, and whether crowding out or complementarity arguments are
necessary for such outcomes. Our analysis provides a platform for simple but rigorous
analysis of other possible relationships between trust and governance and also
suggests that the debate about the relationship between governance and trust could
be fruitfully redirected through greater attention to the analytical structure of the
arguments.
In recent years several scholars have explic-
itly addressed the question of whether trust and
governance mechanisms like contracts and
ownership relate to each other as substitutes or
as complements (Corts & Singh, 2004; Gulati &
Nickerson, in press; Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger,
2004; Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall &
Sampson, in press; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, &
Nooteboom, 2005). While individually insightful,
these studies cumulatively also suggest a be-
wildering array of possible relationships be-
tween trust and governance, at least some of
which appear incompatible with one another.
Trust—the expectation that an exchange part-
ner will not behave opportunistically, even
when such behavior cannot be detected by the
victim—is a powerful alternative to formal gov-
ernance mechanisms that attempt to align in-
centives and control opportunism through mon-
itoring and sanctions (Bradach & Eccles, 1989;
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). By limiting
(concerns about) opportunism, both trust and
governance ultimately allow exchange relation-
ships to be formed, as well as effective adapta-
tion to the changes that are inevitable in any
long-term exchange relationship (Gulati, Law-
rence, & Puranam, 2005; Williamson, 1991). Since
governance mechanisms are not free, trust could
reduce reliance on formal governance mecha-
nisms (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Granovetter,
1985; Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1978; Ring & Van
de Ven, 1992). Indeed, some have argued for a
stronger form of substitution between trust and
governance—reliance on complex governance
mechanisms may actively hinder the develop-
ment of or destroy trust in exchange relation-
ships (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Macaulay, 1963;
Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002).
Yet, as Poppo and Zenger (2002) have shown in
an insightful analysis, trust may also leverage
the effects of governance on exchange perfor-
mance so that it encourages rather than discour-
ages the use of formal governance mechanisms.
Developing this line of reasoning further, Gulati
and Nickerson (in press) have argued that trust
may enhance exchange performance in combi-
nation with formal governance mechanisms
(such as ownership), but at the same time it may
make such mechanisms less necessary. Perhaps
reflecting this diversity of arguments about the
relationships between trust and governance, the
empirical evidence has been mixed; some schol-
ars report a negative relationship between trust
(or its proxies, such as repeated interactions—
although see Vanneste & Puranam [in press] for
the problems with this approach) and gover-
nance complexity (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; Corts
& Singh, 2004; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Gulati,
1995; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004; Parkhe, 1993), while
others report a positive relationship (Luo, 2002;
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Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Ryall & Sampson, in press; Zaheer & Venkatra-
man, 1995), and some find no relationship at all
(Mellewigt, Madhok, & Webel, 2007).
In this paper we attempt to reconcile these
diverse arguments about the relationships be-
tween trust and governance as special cases of
a more general framework.1 The apparent di-
chotomy implied by the “complements-substi-
tutes” terminology fails to capture several dif-
ferent kinds of relationships between trust and
governance that may, in fact, coexist. We use a
simple but general formalization to model three
different kinds of relationships between trust
and governance that play out at different points
in time (see Figure 1). These are (1) the relation-
ship between ex ante levels of trust and the
choice of governance mechanisms (Gulati, 1995);
(2) complementarity—the leveraging effect of a
given level of trust on the relationship between
governance and exchange performance (Poppo
& Zenger, 2002); and (3) crowding out—the influ-
ence of governance mechanisms on suppressing
trust (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). While the
last two are ex post effects that arise after a
governance form is in place, they inevitably
shape the relationship between ex ante trust
and the choice of governance, if such choices
are made with foresight (Williamson, 1985, 1991).
The formalization we employ makes it possible
to study these linkages between ex post effects
and ex ante choices explicitly.
We begin with the premise that trust and gov-
ernance both offer benefits similar to exchange
relationships (Das & Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zaheer & Venkatraman,
1995). Since concerns about opportunism can pre-
vent the formation of an exchange relationship,
trust (which implies the absence of such concerns)
and governance (which alleviates them) both al-
low a basis for exchange. Further, given the lim-
ited rationality of individuals, unexpected
changes in exchange conditions are inevitable;
complex governance and trust both can allow
exchange partners to surmount the coordination
challenges and incentive conflicts created by
change (Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson, 1991). We
formulate a decision problem in which amanager
chooses the appropriate level of governance com-
plexity in order to exploit its benefits, taking into
account the costs of designing and implementing
governance, as well as the preexisting level of
trust between exchange partners and possible
complementarity and crowding out effects be-
tween trust and governance.
Formally analyzing these relationships jointly
gives rise to some surprising insights not easily
accessible with verbal theorizing alone. The basic
one is the sensitivity of predictions about relation-
ships between trust and governance to assump-
tions about the goal of the decision maker. Predic-
tions diverge significantly depending on whether
the manager’s task is framed as one of selecting a
level of governance complexity tomatch the need
for safeguards and adaptation implied by trans-
action characteristics (Gulati, 1995; Parkhe, 1993;
Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), or whether the task
is framed as a problem of maximizing exchange
performance given transaction characteristics
(Corts & Singh, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004;
Saussier, 2000; Williamson, 1991). Researchers typ-
ically have not articulated the nature of the un-
derlying decision problem that they implicitly as-
sume when discussing trust and governance
choices, and this may account for diverging opin-
ions about the relationship between the two. We
go on to obtain several interesting results about
when effects like complementarity or crowding
1 For brevity, we use “governance” to indicate “formal
governance” throughout the paper and treat it as distinct
from trust.
FIGURE 1
Time Line: Governance Choice, Trust, and Benefits
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out are either necessary or unnecessary to predict
a particular sign for the relationship between trust
and governance.
Our analysis provides a rigorous, general, and
integrated approach to studying the complex re-
lationships between trust and governance, and it
allows us to reconcile apparently incompatible
arguments in prior literature. Our analysis offers a
more nuanced yet clearer view of the relationship
between trust and governance than is afforded by
a simple complements-substitutes dichotomy.
More generally, the paper demonstrates the ad-
vantages of even fairly simple formalizations in
adding insights beyond those easily obtainable
from verbal theorizing alone.
GOVERNANCE, TRUST, AND EXCHANGE
Given bounded rationality and self-interested
or opportunistic behavior, economic exchange
can be plagued by failures of cooperation and
coordination, especially in situations of bilat-
eral dependence between exchange partners
(Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson, 1991). Transac-
tion cost economics has explored in depth how
investments in transaction-specific assets cre-
ate holdup situations, which opportunistic ac-
tors may exploit (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian,
1978; Williamson, 1985). The inherent challenges
for economic transactions appear even more se-
vere once we take into account the dynamic and
uncertain environment in which they often take
place. Indeed, Hayek argued that “the economic
problem of society is mainly one of rapid adap-
tation to changes in the particular circum-
stances of time and place” (1945: 524). In chang-
ing circumstances exchange partners not only
have to account for hazards that were foreseen
but also have to adapt to conditions that were
unforeseen at the initiation of the transaction
(Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson, 1991).
An extensive body of work, including the
transaction cost perspective, has helped to de-
velop the view of formal governance mecha-
nisms (such as firms and complex contracts) as
providing the necessary safeguards and adap-
tation mechanisms that can protect economic
exchange from the consequences of bounded
rationality and opportunism (Coase, 1937; Wil-
liamson, 1975). More recently, scholars drawing
from the sociological tradition have shifted the
focus to informal governance in the form of trust,
since trust can provide benefits similar to those
of formal governance in terms of controlling op-
portunism and facilitating adaptation (Bradach
& Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995;
Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1978; Uzzi, 1997).
In order to model how trust and governance,
individually and jointly, enable exchange, we
conceive of a “production function” in which
trust and governance complexity are the key
inputs, with interactions between them defined
in terms of the crowding out and complementa-
rity effects. The outputs are the benefits to ex-
change deriving from trust and governance—in
terms of safeguards and the capacity for adapt-
ing to changing circumstances.2 We now dis-
cuss in detail these benefits and costs. See Fig-
ure 2 for an overview.
The Benefits and Costs of Governance
Governance mechanisms differ in their ability
to mitigate incentive conflict and to enable co-
ordinated action, based on their complexity. Dis-
tinguishing between basic types of governance
modes, Williamson (1975) argued that hierar-
chies differ from markets in that the former fea-
ture administrative controls, such as authority,
rules, and procedures. These instruments en-
able coordinated actions even in situations of
high interdependence and complexity (March &
Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). Hierarchies are
also characterized by suppressed incentive in-
tensity and superior monitoring mechanisms,
which mitigate the effects of conflicting incen-
tives; opportunism is therefore less likely to be a
hindrance. Williamson (1991) further argued that
hybrid arrangements (e.g., alliances and joint
ventures), which combine some aspects of mar-
ket relationships (such as prices) as well as hi-
erarchical structures (such as continuity of as-
sociation, rules, and authority), lie intermediate
between markets and hierarchies. This ordering
of markets, hybrids, and hierarchies also holds
when we consider their “adaptive capacity”—
their capacity to adapt to changes in the ex-
change setting that were unforeseen at the time
2 While such benefits may also be thought of in terms of
the avoidance of costs (such as those arising from holdup,
bargaining, and coordination failure), we follow the practice
of treating them as benefits in order to distinguish them from
the costs incurred in setting up and implementing gover-
nance structures (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Williamson,
1991).
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of governance initiation (Gulati et al., 2005; Wil-
liamson, 1991).3
While the preceding discussion focused on
discrete governance modes and their ordering
in terms of governance complexity (i.e., from
markets to hierarchies), it is also possible to
think of increasing complexity of governance
within a governance mode, such as increasing
contractual detail within contracting. Contrac-
tual detail is the extent to which clauses are
specified in a contract (Mayer & Argyres, 2004;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & Sampson, in
press). Analogous to the benefits of more com-
plex governance modes, more detailed contracts
are expected to provide better safeguards and
more powerful mechanisms to achieve adapta-
tion when necessary (Mayer & Argyres, 2004;
Parkhe, 1993). We articulate this assumption
about the general relationship between the ex-
tent of governance complexity employed and
the resulting benefits to exchange in terms of
safeguards and adaptive capacity as follows.
Assumption 1: More governance com-
plexity provides more benefits to an
exchange relationship.
Setting up complex governance is costly. For
instance, there are costs for adding contractual
detail, such as the cost of negotiating, bargain-
ing, drafting, and reaching agreement on the
terms (Batenburg, Raub, & Snijders, 2003; Ma-
caulay, 1963). In the case of the choice between
governance modes, designing and implement-
ing more complex forms of governance, such as
hybrids and hierarchies, are costlier than rely-
ing on market relationships (Williamson, 1985,
1991).
It is important to note that the costs of gover-
nance complexity—in terms of the costs of de-
signing and implementing governance struc-
tures of a particular level of complexity—are
incurred at the initiation of a governance format.
The benefits in terms of rapid decision making,
avoidance of costly renegotiation, rapid adapta-
tion, and discouragement of attempts to behave
opportunistically all arise during the period that
3 Following prior research (Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson,
1991), we focus on adaptation within the existing relation-
ship, where parties to the exchange prefer continuation of
the relationship over switching. Also note that the apparent
inflexibility that characterizes hierarchy (in the form of rules
and procedures) is not incompatible with adaptiveness. This
is because constraints on individual action are compatible
with joint adaptation. Put differently, adaptation problems
in organizations often resemble coordination games, in
which convergence to an equilibrium is preferable to non-
convergence (Camerer & Knez, 1996). Rules, authority, proce-
dures, and other such aspects of governance that appear to
create inflexibility may guide such a convergence.
FIGURE 2
Theoretical Model of Governance, Trust, Benefits, and Costs
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the governance form is in force. For instance, in
discussing governance complexity in the con-
text of markets, hybrids, and hierarchies, Wil-
liamson (1991) distinguished between the irre-
ducible setup costs of transactions and the
potential adaptation benefits, which differ with
governance complexity. The costs of governance
complexity we model here refer to these irreduc-
ible setup costs. Thus, our second assumption
relates the cost of governance to governance
complexity.
Assumption 2: The greater the chosen
level of governance complexity, the
greater the cost of setting up such gov-
ernance mechanisms will be.
The Benefits of Trust
Trust is “a type of expectation that alleviates
the fear that one’s exchange partner will act
opportunistically” (Bradach & Eccles, 1989: 104),
even when it is not possible to monitor that
partner (Mayer et al., 1995). Social psychologists
have found that interpersonal trust develops out
of prior interactions (Deutsch, 1973; Rempel,
Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), while organizational re-
searchers have shown empirically that interfirm
trust increases with repeated interactions
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Gulati & Sytch, 2008;
Parkhe, 1993). The information from prior inter-
actions provides an opportunity to evaluate oth-
ers’ intentions and motives (Lindskold, 1978).
This forms a basis for predictions about future
behavior and inferences about trustworthiness
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Bhattacharya, Devin-
ney, & Pillutla, 1998; Buskens & Raub, 2002;
Kramer, 1999; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).4
If it is present in an exchange relationship,
mutual trust decreases concerns about oppor-
tunism and allows exchanging partners to
transact, even in the face of potential holdup
problems (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Kramer, 1999;
Mayer et al., 1995). When unexpected changes
arise, trust enables the parties to the exchange
to proceed with implementing necessary
changes, rather than worrying about opportu-
nistic attempts to redistribute gains. Further,
trust enhances the predictability of others’ ac-
tions (Gulati, 1995). This enhanced predictability
allows exchange partners to anticipate others’
actions and to adjust their own accordingly
when the need for such adjustment arises.
Hence, trust also enhances adaptive capacity.
We summarize this assumption about the bene-
fits of ex post trust (i.e., trust present after the
initiation of the transaction) to exchange as fol-
lows.
Assumption 3: The greater the level of
ex post trust in the exchange relation-
ship, the greater the benefits to the
relationship will be.
Ex Post Relationships Between Governance
and Trust
While both trust and governance provide in-
dependent benefits to exchange, there are also
important relationships between them that arise
ex post: crowding out and complementarity ef-
fects. First, we discuss crowding out.
The use of complex governance mechanisms
can crowd out trust in the sense that the level of
trust in the relationship can be eroded when the
partners rely on complex governance. Reliance
on complex contracts or partial or complete eq-
uity ownership to manage an exchange rela-
tionship may signal a lack of trust to exchange
partners (Macaulay, 1963). If one is not trusted,
one trusts less, leading to a lower level of trust
in the relationship (Enzle & Anderson, 1993).
Thus, the adoption of complex governance
mechanisms may directly reduce the level of
trust in the relationship (Frey, 1997; Ghoshal &
Moran, 1996). We call this the “direct crowding
out effect.”
Assumption 4: Governance complexity
reduces the level of ex post trust in the
exchange relationship.
The direct crowding out effect acts to suppress
the level of trust in an exchange relationship
after a governance structure has been selected,
independent of the level of preexisting (ex ante)
4 The relational contracting literature suggests that be-
sides a backward-looking aspect to trust, there is also a
forward-looking component. Concerns for reputation (Klein
& Leffler, 1981) and the value of future interactions (Levin,
2003) may produce “trust” and trustworthy behavior, even in
the absence of a shared history. Such forward-looking in-
stances of cooperative behavior may be better captured un-
der the label assurance (Williamson, 1993). Our own argu-
ments about trust in this paper are most applicable to the
backward-looking aspects of trust.
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trust in the relationship. It is also possible to
conceive of an additional indirect crowding out
effect, where governance complexity serves to
reduce the “buildup” or “carryover” of trust into
an exchange relationship. Assume that there is
an ex ante level of trust between potential ex-
change partners A and B. All else being equal,
such ex ante trust will be positively associated
with trust in the relationship once it is formed.
This is because, absent the destruction of trust,
ex ante trust will simply be “carried forward”
into the relationship. Indeed, trust in the rela-
tionship may build up and increase relative to
ex ante levels. In the course of the relationship,
several opportunities will normally arise for the
parties to engage in either trustworthy or oppor-
tunistic behavior. In the absence of formal gov-
ernance, trustworthy behavior will be recog-
nized as such, leading to an updated and
increased level of trust in the relationship
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Parkhe, 1993; Ring &
Van de Ven, 1992).
However, now consider what happens when a
complex governance structure is put in place to
manage the exchange. The introduction of for-
mal governance mechanisms can impede this
process of trust formation, since trustworthy be-
havior is less likely to be attributed to the actor
than to the governance mechanism (Malhotra &
Murnighan, 2002; Strickland, 1958). As such, gov-
ernance complexity weakens the positive asso-
ciation between ex ante trust and trust in the
relationship. We call this the “indirect crowding
out effect.”
Note that both direct and indirect crowding
out serve to reduce trust in an exchange rela-
tionship, by either lowering the level of ex post
trust in absolute terms (direct crowding out) or
weakening the positive association between ex
ante trust and ex post trust (indirect crowding
out). We formalize the indirect crowding out ef-
fect as follows.
Assumption 5: Governance complexity
weakens the positive association be-
tween ex ante trust and ex post trust in
the exchange relationship.
While governance mechanisms may crowd out
trust relative to ex ante levels, at the same time it
is possible that ex post trust and governance
mechansisms will enhance each other’s benefits,
for any given level of each. This has been referred
to as the complementarity effect of trust on gover-
nance (Gulati & Nickerson, in press; Poppo &
Zenger, 2002). To see how this complementarity
effect can work, consider the following: all con-
tractual clauses are ultimately imperfect in the
sense that it is difficult to completely and unam-
biguously describe the relevant contingency and
appropriate action. Without trust, these ambigu-
ities might give rise to opportunistic attempts to
hold up an exchange partner, which can frustrate
efficient adaptation to changing circumstances.
With trust, contractual clauses—however imper-
fect—will not raise concerns about opportunistic
exploitation but, rather, will serve as a useful ba-
sis for efficient adaptation. In the presence of trust,
therefore, an imperfect clause offers more protec-
tion than in the absence of trust, because trust can
act as a “lubricant” that fills in the gaps (Arrow,
1974). Thus, the value to increasing governance
complexity is greater in the presence of trust than
in its absence. This is the classic analytical defi-
nition of complementarity (Milgrom & Roberts,
1995), which is discussed by Poppo and Zenger
(2002: 718) as a plausible relationship between
trust and formal governance.
Conversely, trust can be more valuable when it
coexists with complex contracts that help to pre-
vent coordination failures. While trust resolves
uncertainty about motives and helps to align in-
centives, successful exchange relationships also
require protection from coordination failures (Gu-
lati et al., 2005). The terms of the contract serve as
an important coordination device by encoding
common knowledge (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). More
complex contracts perform this function to a
greater extent, thus providing greater coordina-
tion benefits. Similar arguments have been made
about the possible complementarities between
trust and governance modes such as markets and
hierarchies (Gulati & Nickerson, in press). We for-
malize these complementary joint effects of gov-
ernance and trust as follows.
Assumption 6: Governance complexity
enhances the marginal benefits of ex
post trust in exchange relationships,
and vice versa.
In the next section we develop a simple formal
model that allows us to explore the joint impli-
cations of these assumptions for how a decision
maker with foresight will make governance
choices. In particular, we are interested in ex-
ploring how the ex post effects—complementa-
rity and crowding out—influence the relation-
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ship between ex ante trust and the choice of
governance complexity.
MODEL
Our model represents the problem that a de-
cision maker (with foresight) faces in choosing
an appropriate governance form for a transac-
tion with another independent entity.5 The
choice variable is C [0,3, which captures the
complexity of governance relied on in managing
the transaction. The symbols t and T denote ex
ante and ex post levels of trust. We describe the
model structure below, as well as how it cap-
tures the theoretical Assumptions 1 through 6
discussed earlier.
As we have noted, both trust and governance
mechanisms are potentially valuable because
of the benefits to exchange they confer, and they
may act not only independently but also in com-
bination (Assumptions 1, 3, and 6). We therefore
specify a very general benefit function, which
imposes the least possible structure on the func-
tional form:
B  f(C)  g(T(C,t))
 f(C)g(T(C,t)), where C,t,T 0. (1)
There are potentially a large number of pro-
duction functions that could be used to model
the benefits to exchange generated by trust and
governance, yet the formulation in (1) is partic-
ularly appropriate for several reasons. First, it is
easy to characterize the independent and com-
bined effects distinctly; the functions f and g
model the independent benefits of governance
and trust, respectively, when there is no interac-
tion between them (  0). The functions f and g
are nonnegative, monotonically increasing in C
and T, respectively, (f(C) 0, f/C 0, g(T(C,t))
0, g/T  0). Further, we also impose the as-
sumption that there are diminishing marginal
returns to trust; the benefits of trust increase
with trust levels but at a decreasing rate, 2g/
T2  0. Thus, initial increases in trust are more
valuable than later increases of the same mag-
nitude. The diminishing marginal benefits as-
sumption is common to many social phenom-
ena, and it appears plausible for trust. It is also
in line with prior research showing that the ca-
pacity of trust to facilitate adaptation dimin-
ishes for higher levels of trust (Uzzi, 1997). How-
ever, we later relax this assumption in our
section on extensions. Note also that we make
no specific assumption on the nature of the sec-
ond derivative of f at this point.
Second, the single parameter   0 captures
the nature of the interaction between the effects
of governance and trust as stated in Assumption
6. When   0, f and g are complements, in the
sense that each enhances the marginal value of
the other. Third, the magnitude of the interac-
tion—complementarity—does not vary with the
levels of the functions f and g; it is always . All
three properties aid interpretation and enhance
the mapping between theory and the model.
Thus, it becomes possible to examine situations
where there are no interaction effects, or to sep-
arately evaluate the interactive and indepen-
dent benefits of trust and governance quite
easily. Furthermore, by changing a single pa-
rameter, one can study variations in the magni-
tude of the complementarity effects. Similar for-
mulations have been widely used to model
complementarities in team theory, as well as
models of incentive structure (e.g., Cremer, 1993;
Petersen, 1992; Siggelkow, 2002).
The cost of governance as specified in As-
sumption 2 is captured as follows:
K  h(C)  0;
h
C  0. (2)
Thus, the cost of governance, h, is a nonnega-
tive, monotonically increasing function (we im-
pose no restriction at this stage on the second
derivative). All else being equal, the level of
trust in the relationship (T) is a nonnegative
quantity that increases in the levels of ex ante
trust (t). This implies
T(C,t)  0;
T
t  0. (3)
The direct crowding out effect is modeled as
T/C  0, whereas the indirect crowding out
effect is modeled as 2T/Ct  0, as specified in
5 In line with previous research, we model the decision
making of one party; we could view the results from the
model as what would be most preferred by each individual
partner—with what actually prevails in any given relation-
ship also being affected by bargaining power.
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Assumptions 4 and 5. The absence of direct and
indirect crowding out effects is treated as T/
C  0 and 2T/Ct  0, respectively.6
With these three elements in place, we are
ready to consider the problem facing a decision
maker who is seeking to choose an appropriate
level of formal governance complexity for a
transaction. We assume the actions unfold
across three periods (see Figure 1). In the first
period the decision maker chooses an optimal
level of governance complexity for the relation-
ship, given an ex ante trust level, and imple-
ments it, incurring relevant setup costs. In the
second period, which commences after a gover-
nance structure has been implemented for the
relationship, the crowding out effect operates
and the level of ex post trust is determined. In
the third period ex post trust and governance
complexity jointly and in interaction generate
benefits to the exchange in terms of smoothing
adaptation and providing safeguards. The deci-
sion maker anticipates what is likely to happen
in the second and third periods, and, therefore,
his first period decision on governance complex-
ity accounts for this. We frame this first period
decision problem in two different ways, and, as
we will show, the framing matters for the re-
sults.
First, we consider the “matching” approach,
in which the decision maker forms some esti-
mate of the “sufficient” level of adaptive capac-
ity and safeguards necessary—H (perhaps
based on transactional characteristics)—and
then chooses governance complexity sufficient
to generate this level of benefit, keeping in
mind the level of preexisting trust. This two-
step process—an initial assessment of what is
sufficient, followed by a choice of governance
complexity that “fills in” what is still required
after the effects of preexisting trust—defines the
matching approach. The decision maker is thus
satisficing (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon,
1958) by seeking a sufficient level of benefits (H),
rather than following a completely rational op-
timization approach seeking to equate the mar-
ginal benefits of governance complexity with its
marginal costs. However, conditional on the
choice of H, the matching approach does imply
a rational approach to using formal governance
to “fill in the gap” between H and what preex-
isting trust can provide. This combination of
bounded and more rational behavior is very
similar in spirit to the standard transaction cost
economics assumption that while decision mak-
ers are boundedly rational in their ability to
foresee future contingencies, they are still ra-
tional in the sense that they can indulge in far-
sighted contracting (Williamson, 1996).
The matching logic underlies the arguments
set forth by Macaulay (1963), who noted that
noncontractual mechanisms such as norms and
trust often provide sufficient protection on their
own. More recently, the matching logic often has
been (implicitly) invoked in the management lit-
erature on the interplay between trust and gov-
ernance. For instance, Gulati (1995: 94) has ar-
gued that trust “reduces the imperative to use
equity” as a protection mechanism in alliances.
If trust sufficiently reduces the fear of opportu-
nistic behavior, then there is no role for equity.
Likewise, Parkhe (1993) and Zaheer and Ven-
katraman (1995) have suggested that trust re-
duces opportunism and therefore diminishes the
need for contractual safeguards.
Our formalization of the matching approach
tries to stay close to the two-step process de-
scribed above. The satisficing behavior of the
decision maker generates the constraint B  H,
which we simply take as given and then calcu-
late the optimal level of governance complexity
conditional on this constraint. The optimization
problem we solve is thus one of minimizing
costs of governance (K) subject to the constraint
that the level of benefits generated by gover-
nance complexity and trust matches the level
that the decision maker decides is sufficient (H).
Since the costs of governance are monotonically
increasing in complexity, this is equivalent to
solving for the lowest value of C that satisfies
B  H. We can think of this as optimization
conditional on the constraint that B  H.7
The second approach we take is to “maxi-
mize” the performance of the exchange relation-
ship with respect to C. We assume that ex-
change performance can be conceptualized as
6 Note that, given our definition, it is analytically not fea-
sible to have an indirect crowding out effect without a direct
crowding out effect; it is, however, possible to have a direct
crowding out effect without an indirect crowding out effect.
7 Also see Camerer (2003: 474–475) for a discussion of the
idea that optimality may indeed guide actions even though
the problem formulation itself is faulty. Thus, the matching
approach presumes optimal choice conditional on the (im-
perfect) representation of the optimization problem.
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benefits of governance and trust net the costs of
governance. This approach is formally equiva-
lent to maximizing (B  K) and is therefore a
“more” rational approach than the matching
logic, which involves satisficing. With the max-
imizing formulation, transaction characteristics
play an indirect role in influencing the marginal
benefits of governance and trust; both are likely
to have a greater impact on exchange perfor-
mance when transactions are prone to hazards
than when they are not. In this approach the
optimization problem is one of finding the level
of governance complexity that maximizes the
difference between the benefits and costs of
governance.
The maximizing approach most frequently ap-
pears in economics—and is most relevant in
transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson,
1975, 1985). For instance, Williamson (1991) has
suggested that optimal governance complexity
(in his case markets, hybrids, or hierarchies) is
chosen such that the difference between bene-
fits and costs is maximized, given a level of
asset specificity. Similarly, when thinking of
governance complexity as the level of contrac-
tual detail, one can distinguish between costs
(e.g., the cost of negotiating and writing the con-
tract) and benefits (e.g., protection against op-
portunistic behavior). Saussier (2000), Corts and
Singh (2004), and Kalnins and Mayer (2004) have
explicitly considered the case where agents
maximize performance when deciding what
contract to use, where performance equals ben-
efits minus costs.
RESULTS
Our goal is to state which of the ex post effects
(complementarity, direct or indirect crowding
out) are necessary (or unnecessary) to predict a
particular sign for the relationship between the
extent of governance complexity and the level of
ex ante trust in a relationship. We first state the
results obtained through the matching approach
and then turn to the maximizing approach
(proofs of all propositions can be found in the
Appendix).
Proposition 1: Under the matching ap-
proach, neither complementarity nor
crowding out effects are necessary to
obtain a negative relationship be-
tween the level of ex ante trust and
governance complexity.
The intuition for this result is fairly simple. If
ex ante trust levels go up, then the benefits
generated through trust go up; since the re-
quired level of benefits remains constant for a
given set of transactional attributes, the benefits
generated through governance (and therefore
reliance on complex governance) must go
down.8 While the intuition for Proposition 1 is
simple, the striking aspect of this result is that,
under the matching logic, the ex post crowding
out and complementarity effects are logically
unnecessary for predicting that ex ante trust
leads to lower levels of governance complexity.
Conversely, one cannot infer the existence of a
crowding out or complementarity effect simply
because there is a negative relationship be-
tween ex ante trust and governance complexity.
Proposition 2: Under the matching ap-
proach, a direct crowding out effect is
necessary to generate a positive rela-
tionship between the level of ex ante
trust and governance complexity.
The intuition for this result may be expressed
as follows. In the matching model, in the pres-
ence of a direct crowding out effect, an increase
in governance complexity has two opposing ef-
fects. First, the benefits generated through gov-
ernance complexity increase. Second, the bene-
fits generated through trust decline (because of
the negative effect of governance complexity on
ex post trust). When the direct crowding out ef-
fect is strong, the second effect may dominate
the first. In such instances, if ex ante trust goes
up (which positively affects ex post trust and
increases the immediate benefits generated
through trust), governance complexity must
change for the total level of benefits to remain
constant. Given strong direct crowding out, gov-
ernance complexity must increase to offset the
consequences of higher ex ante trust. The sur-
prising implication is that one needs to argue
for a negative impact of governance complexity
8 An alternative intuition is to treat (1) as describing a
series of isoquants that generate the same levels of benefits,
B, for different combinations of t and C. Regardless of their
concavity or convexity, on any isoquant, an increase in t
must be offset by a decrease in C, since the goal is to select
the isoquant that generates the requisite level of B ( H) at
the lowest level of C possible.
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on ex post trust in order to justify a positive
relationship between optimal governance com-
plexity and ex ante trust.
Note that in line with Proposition 2, in the
absence of a direct crowding out effect, a
complementarity effect alone cannot generate a
positive relationship between governance com-
plexity and ex ante trust. On the contrary, in the
absence of a direct crowding out effect, comple-
mentarity is consistent with a negative relation-
ship between governance complexity and ex
ante trust. The intuition is similar to Proposition
1, since a rise in ex ante trust and, thus, in the
benefits generated through trust necessitates a
lower level of benefits generated through gov-
ernance. A lower level of governance complexity
suffices (and complementarity only increases
the benefits from governance complexity).
Finally, we note that in the matching model
neither changes in the cost of governance nor
changes in the indirect crowding out effect (for
any given direct crowding out effect) play a role
in determining the relationship between ex ante
trust and optimal governance complexity (see
the Appendix). Thus, if scholars have in mind a
matching model such as ours, they must be
aware that it is unnecessary to invoke either
crowding out or complementarity to argue for a
negative relationship between ex ante trust and
governance complexity. Furthermore, a comple-
mentarity effect (of any magnitude) is insuffi-
cient to generate a positive relationship be-
tween ex ante trust and governance complexity.
Rather, a direct crowding out effect is necessary.
Alternately, if scholars use a matching ap-
proach to generate predictions that are inconsis-
tent with the ones presented here, they should
make clear how their assumptions differ from
ours.
Next we turn to the maximizing approach.
Proposition 3: Under the maximizing
approach, there is no relationship be-
tween the level of ex ante trust and
governance complexity if there are
neither crowding out nor complemen-
tarity effects.
Put differently, either complementarity or
crowding out is necessary for there to be any
relationship between governance complexity
and ex ante trust. The intuition for this result can
be expressed as follows. In the maximizing ap-
proach the optimal level of governance com-
plexity equates the marginal benefits with the
marginal costs. As can be seen from (1), ex ante
levels of trust influence the marginal benefits of
governance through complementarity between
trust and governance (the  f g term), as well as
through the crowding out effect built into the
contribution of trust in the benefit function (g).
Without complementarity, the  f g term does
not exist, and without crowding out (3), ex ante
trust will simply increase the level of trust in the
relationship independent of governance com-
plexity. Ex ante levels of trust therefore will play
no role in shaping themarginal benefits or costs
of governance in the absence of both comple-
mentarities and constraints.
Proposition 3 points to important differences
for the role of the ex post effects—complemen-
tarity and crowding out—in the matching and
the maximizing models. In the former, comple-
mentarity and crowding out effects are not nec-
essary to produce the result that ex ante trust
lowers optimal governance complexity. In the
maximizing model, in contrast, at least one of
the ex post effects is necessary to generate any
relationship between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity.
Proposition 4: Under the maximizing
approach, a strong indirect crowding
out effect relative to the direct crowd-
ing out effect is necessary to generate
a negative relationship between the
level of ex ante trust and governance
complexity.
The corollary is that if the direct crowding out
effect is stronger relative to the indirect crowd-
ing out effect, there is a positive relationship
between governance complexity and ex ante
trust. Thus, as with the matching model, with a
direct crowding out effect alone, the relationship
between ex ante trust and governance complex-
ity is positive.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows.
Ex ante trust affects the marginal benefit of gov-
ernance complexity in two ways: through the
complementarity effect (the  f g term) and
through the crowding out effect built into the
contribution of trust to the benefit function (g)—
both via the level of ex post trust. Assume there
is no complementarity effect to begin with and
consider only the direct crowding out effect. An
increase in ex ante trust raises the level of ex
post trust. For higher levels of ex post trust, the
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crowding out effect of governance complexity
weakens in terms of lowering the marginal ef-
fect of ex post trust because the trust benefit
function (g) is concave. Thus, the marginal ben-
efits of governance complexity increase as ex
ante trust goes up. The optimal level of gover-
nance complexity is the point where the mar-
ginal benefits and costs are identical. This
therefore results in a positive relationship be-
tween ex ante trust and governance complexity.
Now consider the indirect crowding out effect,
which, by definition, strengthens the direct
crowding out effect of governance complexity on
ex post trust when ex ante trust increases. With
an indirect crowding out effect, an increase in ex
ante trust has two opposing effects. First, because
g is concave, the marginal benefit of governance
complexity goes up (as explained above). Second,
the strength of the direct crowding out effect in-
creases. This decreases the marginal benefit of
governance complexity. If the second effect is
stronger than the first (i.e., if the direct crowding
out effect is stronger relative to the indirect crowd-
ing out effect), ex ante trust will be negatively
related to governance complexity.
Proposition 5: Under the maximizing
approach, in the absence of a crowd-
ing out effect, a complementarity ef-
fect is necessary to generate a positive
relationship between the level of ex
ante trust and governance complexity.
Ex ante levels of trust influence the marginal
benefits of governance through complemen-
tarity (the  f g term), as well as through the
crowding out effect built into the benefits of trust
(g)—both via the level of ex post trust. Without
crowding out, ex ante trust will simply increase
the level of trust in the relationship and there-
fore strengthen the complementarity effect as
well, resulting in a positive relationship between
ex ante trust and optimal governance levels.
Thus, in the maximizing model complementarity
and the direct crowding out effect both “push in
the same direction”—toward a positive trust-
governance complexity relationship.
Again, the differences between the matching
andmaximizing approaches are striking. A strong
indirect crowding out effect is necessary to obtain
a negative relationship between ex ante trust and
governance complexity in the maximizing model;
in the matching model such an effect is irrelevant
for the direction of the relationship. In the absence
of a crowding out effect, a complementarity effect
is insufficient to generate a positive relationship
between ex ante trust and optimal governance
complexity in the matching approach, but it is
necessary in the maximizing approach. These re-
sults suggest that to the extent that scholars have
in mind a maximization model whose structure
conforms to ours, they must be aware that it is
impossible to specify a relationship between trust
and governance complexity absent complementa-
rity, crowding out, or both. Further, an indirect
crowding out effect is necessary to argue for a
negative trust-governance relationship.
To illustrate the consequences of the comple-
mentarity and crowding out effects in both the
matching and maximizing approaches, we gen-
erate graphs in Figure 3 using a specific set of
functional forms that conform to the conditions
set out in (1), (2), and (3) (see the Appendix for
details). This illustration tellingly shows how
with the same basic relationships (i.e., model
specification) completely opposite predictions
can be generated by simply changing a single
assumption about the presence or absence of




While the model we have analyzed has a
fairly general form, we recognize nonetheless
that not all scholars may choose to model some
of the effects in the same way. Accordingly, in
this section we explore the consequences of re-
laxing and changing some of the assumptions
underlying our core model. All proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
Extension 1: Constant/Increasing Marginal
Returns to Ex Post Trust
In our basic model we assume decreasing
marginal returns to trust—that the benefits of
trust to exchange increase with the level of trust
but at a decreasing rate (2g/T2  0). While this
assumption seems a plausible description of the
effects of trust, it is, in fact, unnecessary in the
matching approach, which only requires that
the benefits of trust increase with the level of
trust.
For the maximizing approach, the impact of
the direct crowding out effect is sensitive to the
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assumption about returns to trust. With constant
returns to trust (2g/T2 0) or increasing returns
to trust (2g/T2  0), the direct crowding out
effect no longer serves as a force that creates a
positive association between trust and gover-
nance complexity. Recall that this positive asso-
FIGURE 3
The Effect of Complementarity and Direct and Indirect Crowding Out on the Relationship
Between Ex Ante Trust (t) and the Level of Governance Complexity (C)a
a See the Appendix for functional forms used and parameter values.
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ciation arose because with the direct crowding
out effect an increase in governance complexity
lowered the level of ex post trust, but increased
its marginal impact owing to the concavity of g.
Therefore, the conditions laid out in Propositions
4 and 5 become less stringent since the indirect
and direct crowding out effects are not pitted
against each other anymore. Thus, with con-
stant returns to trust, only the existence of an
indirect crowding out effect is necessary to gen-
erate a negative relationship between ex ante
trust and optimal governance complexity; with
increasing returns to trust, only a direct crowd-
ing out effect is necessary to generate a nega-
tive association between trust and governance
complexity (Proposition 4). Note that the pres-
ence of an indirect crowding out effect implies
the existence of a direct one. With either con-
stant or increasing returns to trust, a comple-
mentarity effect is necessary to get a positive
association between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity, whether or not a crowding out
effect is present (Proposition 5).
Extension 2: Trust and Governance As
Substitutes
In our model we allow for complementarity in
the relationship between trust and governance.
Now we explore the possibility of a substitution
relationship between trust and governance—
that is, trust lowers the marginal benefits of
governance complexity, and vice versa. Note
that this is different from (and may coexist with)
the crowding out effect, which is a lowering of
the level of trust in a relationship due to the use
of complex formal governance mechanisms. In
our framework a substitution effect is easily
modeled by setting   0, which implies that f
and g are substitutes, because each lowers the
marginal value of the other (Siggelkow, 2002).
With such a substitution effect, in the match-
ing model we find that a crowding out effect is
no longer necessary to generate a positive rela-
tionship between ex ante trust and governance
complexity (as stated in Proposition 2); it can
arise from the substitution effect alone as well.
Ex ante trust serves simply to lower the mar-
ginal effect of governance complexity, leading
to the need for “more” complexity in order to
satisfy B  H.
In the maximizing model we find that an indi-
rect crowding out effect is no longer necessary
to generate a negative association between ex
ante trust and governance complexity (as stated
in Proposition 4); it can arise from the substitu-
tion effect alone. In this model the optimal level
of governance complexity equates the marginal
benefits of governance complexity to its costs.
An increase in ex ante trust lowers the marginal
benefits of governance complexity (via the sub-
stitution effect) and therefore results in a lower
optimal level of governance complexity. Thus,
with a substitution effect, at least one of the
crowding out effects is now necessary for a pos-
itive relationship between ex ante trust and gov-
ernance complexity (see the Appendix for fur-
ther details).
Extension 3: Allowing Ex Ante Trust to Affect
the Cost of Governance
In our basic model we only consider the
benefits of trust, not its implications for gov-
ernance costs. It is possible to conceptualize
trust not only as acting to mitigate the effects
of opportunism and enable adaptation (as in
our model) but as acting to lower the marginal
cost of governance complexity as well. In other
words, ex ante trust could make the setting up
of governance itself less costly, for any level of
governance complexity. We can modify the
model to allow for the existing level of trust to
lower the marginal cost of governance com-
plexity (hC,t  0).
As before, the results in the matching model
are unaffected, since the costs of governance do
not feature in that model directly. In the maxi-
mizing model Propositions 3 and 5 are modified.
In the absence of both complementarity and
crowding out effects, there will now be a posi-
tive association between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity (Proposition 3) so that the
complementarity effect is not necessary to gener-
ate such an association in the maximizing model
(Proposition 5). This is not very surprising, because
allowing ex ante trust to lower the marginal cost
of governance complexity is analytically equiva-
lent to an additional complementarity effect be-
tween ex ante trust and governance complexity:
trust enhances the marginal effect of governance
complexity on exchange performance.
In the preceding analysis of alternative for-
mulations, we were careful to note how our
propositions stated in the previous section
change, in order to make transparent the as-
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sumptions on which our results depended.
However, the analysis here confirms the ro-
bustness of our fundamental point—that the
choice of the underlying optimization model
(matching or maximizing) matters greatly. An
obvious illustration of this point is that the
changes we introduce in the model with each
extension above have different (and often op-
posite) implications for the matching and max-
imizing models. Further, the analysis also
shows how our model structure is flexible
enough to serve as a platform to explore alter-
native formulations of the relationships be-
tween trust and governance. For instance,
crowding in effects—such that governance
complexity might encourage the formation of
trust (Grundei, 2006)—can also be easily ac-
commodated in our model.
DISCUSSION
The relationships between trust and formal
governance are both fascinating and convo-
luted. While an increasing number of scholars
are asking whether trust and governance are
complements or substitutes (Corts & Singh, 2004;
Gulati & Nickerson, in press; Lazzarini et al.,
2004; Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall &
Sampson, in press; Woolthuis et al., 2005), the
possible relationships between them are richer
than this dichotomization. Besides making the
case that we have learned as much as we can
from empirical studies that simply ask if trust
and governance are complements or substitutes,
our analysis takes three important steps toward
enhancing our understanding of the relation-
ships between trust and governance.
First, we point to different basic types of rela-
tionships between trust and governance, which
may, however, coexist: trust may enhance the
effect of governance on exchange performance
(complementarity), governance may reduce the
level of trust between exchange partners
(through direct or indirect crowding out), and ex
ante trust may influence the choice of gover-
nance complexity. Our analysis focuses on
showing how the endogenous relationship be-
tween ex ante trust and governance is affected
by the two exogenous and ex post relation-
ships—the crowding out and the complementa-
rity effects. In our extensions we also considered
the possibility of substitution between trust and
governance complexity, as well as the impact of
trust on the cost of governance. The dichotomous
complements-substitutes characterization masks
this variety of possible relationships and can only
lead to terminological confusion. We therefore
hope that our work encourages scholars to clearly
specify the underlying mechanisms they invoke
when proposing particular relationships between
trust and governance complexity.
Second, we also draw attention to the need for
clarity about the logic underlying the optimiza-
tion problem that decision makers implicitly
face when making governance choices. As we
show, the maximizing and the matching models
lead to very different predictions about the
relationships between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity. This difference fundamen-
tally arises from the fact that, in the matching
approach, the decision maker equates the level
of benefits generated through trust and gover-
nance to the perceived need for such benefits in
the form of safeguards and adaptation implied
by transaction characteristics; in the maximiz-
ing model the decision maker equates the mar-
ginal benefits andmarginal costs of governance
complexity. Given the diversity of reported em-
pirical results on the nature of the relationship
between ex ante trust and governance complex-
ity, we hope we have persuaded scholars that
articulating the nature of the underlying deci-
sion-making model—matching or maximizing
—is critical for any meaningful aggregation of
results, and even debate among scholars. Fur-
ther setting aside the empirical question of
which of the two models has better explanatory
power, there may also be fruitful opportunities
for assessing their relative behavioral plausibil-
ity, perhaps in laboratory settings.
Third, our analysis helps us to formally state
and prove which effects are necessary (or un-
necessary) to generate positive and negative
relationships between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity. To obtain a negative trust-
governance relationship, neither crowding out
nor complementarity is necessary in the match-
ing model, whereas a strong indirect crowding
out effect relative to the direct crowding out ef-
fect is necessary in the maximizing model. In fact,
in the maximizing model either a complementar-
ity or crowding out effect is necessary for any
trust-governance relationship. To obtain a posi-
tive trust-governance relationship, a direct crowd-
ing out effect is necessary in the matching model,
and a complementarity or direct crowding out ef-
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fect is necessary in the maximizing model. As can
be seen, these conditions vary significantly across
the matching and maximizing models, and (at
least to us) were not obvious prior to our analysis.
We hope these results will be helpful to scholars
both in strengthening the rationale for their argu-
ments about the expected relationships between
trust and governance complexity and in interpret-
ing their empirical findings appropriately. Of
course, as is always the case with a formal theo-
rizing exercise, it is certainly possible to formulate
other models with different assumptions, which
will also lead to different results. However, we
believe that our analysis serves the valuable pur-
pose of sensitizing scholars to the need for explic-
itly altering the structure of the model in order to
reach different conclusions.
As evidence of the flexibility of our model
structure for exploring such variations, we have
ourselves analyzed some extensions to our basic
model, such as allowing for constant/increasing
returns to trust, assuming a substitution effect be-
tween trust and governance, and allowing trust
to lower governance costs. While some of the re-
sults alter as a consequence, others remain un-
changed, and the overall pattern of results con-
tinues to show a sharp difference between the
matching and maximizing approaches. In addi-
tion to this analytical flexibility, our model struc-
ture also lends itself to some interpretive flexi-
bility. For instance, while our results are based on
the assumption of (conditionally) optimal decision
making informed by knowledge of the comple-
mentarity and crowding out effects, they also can
be used to compare the choices of a decision
maker who is “blind” to certain effects with the
optimal choices (e.g., in the matching model the
choices of a decisionmaker who ignores the direct
crowding out effect will show a negative associa-
tion between trust and governance, whereas it
should be a positive one).
Our model also lends itself to exploration into
how trust and governance may coevolve over
time. In additional simulations (not reported
here), we took the resulting levels of ex post trust
in the relationship in period n as the ex ante
level of trust in period n 1, to see how trust and
governance complexity change over time.9 We
found two basic patterns. First, in situations
with a positive association between ex ante
trust and governance complexity (e.g., only di-
rect crowding out in matching or maximizing),
trust and governance complexity move in the
same direction over time. Note that this does not
imply that both will increase; they could also
decline together. Second, when a negative rela-
tionship is present between ex ante trust and
governance complexity (e.g., only complemen-
tarity in matching or strong indirect crowding
out in maximizing), trust and governance com-
plexity move in opposite directions over time.
Again, in such situations trust could increase or
decrease, as long as governance complexity
moves in the opposite direction. Finally, the re-
lationship between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity may itself change over time
as a result of changes in trust levels (which
influence the magnitude of the crowding out
effects when present). We hope that the possi-
bility of doing this kind of analysis encourages
other scholars to explore these ideas further.
In addition to clarifying theorizing about trust
and governance, our results can help with inter-
preting empirical findings, as well as with spec-
ifying better empirical tests. For instance, some
scholars might argue that a crowding out effect
is implausible in the real world, while others
may question the basis for complementarity.
Our model is useful to both, demonstrating what
the results would be in the absence of each
effect individually. Thus, by arguing for the ex-
istence or absence of effects such as crowding
out and complementarity, one can make rigor-
ously derived, competing predictions about the
expected sign of the relationship between trust
and governance complexity.10
However, an additional interesting direction
for research might be to move concepts such as
crowding out and complementarity out of the
category of unobserved mechanisms, to explicit
moderators that change the sign of the relation-
ship between trust and governance. Thus, in-
stead of simply looking for relationships be-
tween trust and governance complexity, scholars
could also attempt to exploit sources of varia-
tion in the magnitudes of the complementarity
9 Note that the decision maker still optimizes only during
each period rather than across multiple periods.
10 Our results are about the association between ex ante
trust and governance complexity. Because the relationship be-
tween ex ante trust and ex post trust is always positive, the
sign of the relationship between ex post trust and governance
complexity is the same as that of the one we studied.
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and crowding out effects. Such an approach
could go a long way toward reconciling appar-
ently disparate prior results—if the differences
could be shown to arise from differences in the
crowding out and complementarity effects across
the samples of different studies. In order to en-
courage progress in this direction, in Table 1 we
present an attempt to map the effects studied in
our model to possible empirical indicators. We
focus on the three key parameters of interest in our
model: the direct and indirect crowding out effects
and the complementarity effect.
We have argued that governance mecha-
nisms may crowd out trust because the reliance
on governance may be seen as a signal of dis-
trust. Thus, we would expect the crowding out
effect to be stronger when the perceived signal
is stronger, and the signal of distrust may be
stronger if it is common practice to not use any
governance mechanism. For example, certain
markets rely on handshakes rather than written
agreements to close deals. Insisting on a con-
tract in such instances will rapidly crowd out
trust. We have also argued that an indirect
crowding out effect could arise when trust de-
velopment is hampered because of the attribu-
tion of trustworthy behavior to the contract. Such
misattribution may be less likely when the part-
ners to the exchange share a sophisticated un-
derstanding of the strengths and limits of formal
governance (e.g., in the form of legal expertise).
Trust may complement governance mecha-
nisms when it is impossible to specify all con-
tingencies ex ante. Thus, we expect the comple-
mentarity effect to be stronger in situations of
uncertainty and volatility. Furthermore, trust
complements agreements in the sense that
clauses that are nonenforceable in courts are
upheld within the relationship. In part, such
agreements may provide necessary coordina-
tion mechanisms that enhance exchange perfor-
mance (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). This latter effect
should be stronger when the need for coordina-
tion between exchange partners is high—for ex-
ample, in situations of high interdependence be-
tween them (Gulati et al., 2005; Thompson, 1967).
We also recognize the limitations to our re-
search. Aswith all attempts at formal analysis, we
trade off analytical rigor against realism rather
explicitly. We assume (conditionally) optimizing
behavior by a decision maker who is fully in-
formed about the values of the various parameters
in the model. Also, in the tradition of transaction
cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985), as well as
research inspired by it that (implicitly or explicitly)
treats parties’ governance preferences as similar
(e.g., Crocker & Reynolds, 1993), we focus on the
decisions of one party; we could view the results
from the model as (1) describing the behavior of a
disinterested designer who takes the preferences
of both parties into account or (2) what would be
most preferred by each individual partner—with
what actually prevails in any given relationship
being also affected by bargaining power (Gross-
man & Hart, 1986).
We also focus explicitly on trust transforma-
tion during the exchange and take ex ante trust
levels as given. As a direct consequence of this
choice, we are not concerned in this paper with
assurance effects arising from the potential
value of future interactions, which may have
results similar to those of trust. Our analysis,
despite its incorporation of ex post effects into
ex ante optimization, is still somewhat static in
TABLE 1
Crowding Out and Complementarity
Effect Is Stronger When . . .
Direct crowding out Formal contracts are not common practice—The act of proposing a contract can be
perceived as a signal of distrust when trusting individuals propose contracts.
The perceived signal strength of distrust should be greater the less common the
use of a contract is.
Indirect crowding out Parties to the exchange lack legal expertise—In such situations, the growth of
trust in the relationship may be hampered because of misattributions about
cooperative behavior as having arisen from governance rather than from
trustworthy behavior.
Complementarity Ambiguity surrounding exchange is higher—Trust leverages the value of contracts
if they are incompletely specified because of ambiguity. If ambiguity is higher,
then the complementarity effect should be stronger.
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the sense thatwe do notmodel the development of
trust over time in the relationship. However, our
analysis should still yield directionally correct re-
sults since the formulation of the static crowding
out effect we have modeled would still be appro-
priate even if trust in the relationship increased
not only with ex ante trust but also with the dura-
tion of the relationship. Yet an explicitly dynamic
formulation of this trust generation process would
doubtless have advantages in terms of tracing the
time paths of trust development.
In the interest of analytical tractability, we
have modeled governance complexity as a con-
tinuous variable. This maps most closely onto
formal governance through contracts, which can
be of greater or lesser levels of complexity and
detail. However, we believe our results are also
relevant to the case of discrete governance
modes—such as the choice among market, hy-
brid, and hierarchy—for two reasons. First, the
discreteness of these modes may well be pri-
marily a matter of categorization. As many
scholars have noted, hierarchical elements are
found in markets, market elements in hierar-
chies, and both in hybrids (Bradach & Eccles,
1989). Thus, while contracts exist between inde-
pendent firms of various levels of detail and
ownership links exist between firms of various
levels of equity (Kale & Puranam, 2004), this is
not inconsistent with a useful definition of ideal
types such as markets, hybrids, and hierarchies.
Second, in practice, most studies that predict
the choice between discrete governance modes
rest on underlying mechanisms that are contin-
uous. For example, increases in transaction haz-
ards require increases in governance safeguards.
This leads to predictions about the likelihood of a
discrete choice through a latent variable (e.g., in
probit or logit models). Our continuous variable,
governance complexity, can be thought of as such
a latent variable. For these reasons, we believe
that our results on governance complexity as a
continuous variable should be broadly applicable
to the choice of discrete governance modes of in-
creasing levels of complexity.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this
paper makes progress toward untangling the
complex web of relationships linking trust and
governance. Our goal has been to use the sim-
plest and most general formulation possible to
make the basic point at the focus of this paper—that
the “simple” dichotomization of the relation-
ships between trust and governance into “com-
plements” and “substitutes” obscures and con-
fuses more than it simplifies and clarifies.
APPENDIX
1. Model Structure
B  f(C)  g(T(C,t))  f(C)g(T(C,t)) and (a)
K  h(C), (b)
where
C,t  0; f(C)  0,fC  0;
g(T(C,t))  0,gT  0,g T  0, (1)
T(C,t)  0,Tt  0, and (2)
h(C)  0; hC  0. (3)
Complementarity:   0.
Direct crowding out: TC  0.
Indirect crowding out: TC,t  0.
2. The Matching Approach
Let C* be such that F1 	 B  H  0 at C*. (c)













fC gTTC fCg fgTTC

	
gTTt(1  f )
fC(1  g)  gTTC(1  f )
. (d)11
Proposition 1:








t  0, from (1, 2).
In the absence of complementarity
and crowding out effects, there is a
negative relationship between ex
ante trust and governance complexity.
Therefore, neither effect is necessary
to generate this negative relationship.
11 Note that we suppress the arguments of functions in the
notation to ease readability, but they are taken into account
in the analysis.
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Proposition 2:
gTTt(1  f )  0, from (1, 2).
C*
t  0N fC(1  g)  gTTC(1  f)
 0, from (d).
fC(1  g)  gTTC(1  f)  0f TC  0,
since all other terms are nonnegative,
from (1, 2).
In order to obtain a positive relation-
ship between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity, a direct crowding
out effect is necessary.
3. The Maximizing Approach
P 	 B  K  f(C)  g(T(C,t)) 
f(C)g(T(C,t))  h(C). (e)
C* is such that PCC*  0, and if this is
a maximum, PC  0. (f)
PC  fC  gTTC(1  f)  fCg  hC. (g)
F2 	 PC  fC  gTTC(1  f) 
fCg  hC  0. (h)






From (f), at the maximum F2C 0 so that the sign
of
C*
t will be the same as the sign of F2t.
F2t  (gTTtTC  gTTC,t)(1  f)  fCgTTt. (j)
Proposition 3:
TC  TC,t    0f F2t  0.

C*
t  0, from (i).
In the absence of crowding out and
complementarity effects, there is no rela-
tionship between ex ante trust and gov-
ernance complexity. At least one of these




t  0N F2t  0.
F2t  0f gTTtTC  gTTC,t, from (1, 2, j).







A strong indirect crowding out effect,
TC,t, relative to the direct crowding out








essary to generate a negative rela-
tionship between the extent of
governance complexity and the level
of ex ante trust.
Proposition 5:
TC  TC,t  0f F2t  fCgTTt.

C*
t  0N   0, since all other
terms are positive, from (1, 2, j).
In the absence of crowding out effects,
a complementarity effect is necessary
(and any magnitude of complementa-
rity effect is sufficient) for a positive
relationship between ex ante trust
and governance complexity.
4. Specific Functional Form for Graphic Analysis
We illustrate our results in Figure 3 with a











C 	 Ct. (2)
For matching, we set H  1. We consider differ-
ent scenarios in which we manipulate comple-
mentarities () or direct (
) or indirect () crowd-
ing out effects. We use the following parameter




  0, 
  0,
  0





  1, 
  0,
  0





  0, 
  1.75,
  0







Not applicable   0, 
  0,
  1
5. Extensions and Boundary Conditions
§1: Constant/increasing marginal returns to ex
post trust (gT  0)
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In the matching approach,
C*
t does not depend on gT (see [d]).
In the maximizing approach,
gT  0f F2t  (gTTC,t)(1  f )  fCgTTt from ( j).
(gTTC,t)(1  f )  fCgTTt  0f TC,t  0,
from (1, 2).
 TC,t 0 is necessary for
C*
t  0, since all other
terms are nonnegative, from (1, 2).
gT  0f F2t  (gTTtTC  gTTC,t)(1  f )  fCgTTt
from (j), and gTTtTC  0, gTTC,t  0, from (1, 2).
(gTTtTC  gTTC,t)(1  f )  fCgTTt  0f TC  0.
 A strong indirect crowding out effect relative
to the direct crowding out effect (Proposition 4) is
no longer necessary for
C*
t  0; however, at
least a direct crowding out effect is necessary
for
C*
t  0 (because an indirect crowding out
effect implies a direct one).
If gT  0, F2t  0f   0.
If gT  0, F2t  0f   0.
 If gT  0,   0 is necessary for
C*
t  0,
whether crowding out is present or absent (com-
pare with Proposition 5).
§2: Trust and governance as substitutes (  0)
In the matching approach,







t  0N (1  g) and (1  f) have opposite
signs, from (1, 2).
(1  f)  0  (1  g)N
1
g    
1
f or
(1  g)  0  (1  f )N 
1




Hence, even in the absence of crowding out, it
is possible to generate a positive relationship
between ex ante trust and governance com-
plexity—that is, crowding out is no longer nec-
essary for a positive trust-governance rela-
tionship (compare Proposition 2).
In the maximizing approach,
TC  TC,t  0f F2t  fCgTTt.

C*
t  0N   0, since all other terms are
positive, from (1, 2).
Thus, with substitution, indirect crowding out is
no longer necessary to generate a negative re-
lationship between ex ante trust and gover-
nance complexity (compare Proposition 4).
C*
t  0N F2t  0.
F2t  0f (gTTtTC  gTTC,t)(1  f )  0, since all
other terms are negative, from (1, 2).
If (1  f)  0,
C*











If (1  f)  0,
C*











(1  f )  0f
C*
t  0.
Thus, a strong direct crowding out effect (rela-
tive to the indirect effect) is necessary to obtain
C*
t  0 if (1 f) 0. A strong indirect crowding
out effect (relative to the direct effect) is neces-
sary to obtain
C*
t  0 if (1  f)  0 (compare
Proposition 5). If (1  f)  0, then
C*
t  0.
§3: Allowing ex ante trust to affect cost of gover-
nance (hC,t  0)
In the matching approach, the cost of gover-
nance does not feature in the expression for
C*
t
(see [d]). Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 remain
unaffected if ex ante trust reduces the cost of
governance for any level of complexity.
In the maximizing approach, instead of K  h(C)
(b), we let K  h(C,t) (b)
and h(C,t)  0; hC  0; hC,t  0. (3)
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P 	 B  K  f(C)  g(T(C,t))  f(C)g(T(C,t))
 h(C,t). (e)
First- and second-order conditions (w.r.t.C) remain
the same; see (f) and (g).
Let F3 	 PC  fC  gTTC(1  f)  fCg
hC  0. (h)






If this is a maximum, F3C  0 so that the sign of
C*
t will be the same as the sign of F3t.
F3t  (gTTtTC  gTTC,t)(1  f)  fCgTTt
 hC,t. (j)




Thus, in the absence of complementarity and
(in)direct crowding out effects,
C*
t  0. That is,
neither complementarity nor crowding out is
necessary for
C*
t  0 (which modifies both Prop-
ositions 3 and 5). Proposition 4 remains un-
changed.
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